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5 Governance in Small Places:
The Unleashing of Asymmetric Federalism
Godfrey Baldacchino
First Nations, cities, and universities in Canada — apart from provinces, territo-
ries, and municipalities — are engaged in decision-making, often within interlock-
ing and overlapping policy regimes. In Canada and beyond, sub-national (often
island) jurisdictions are additional actors in a contemporary game of intersecting
governance. Successful examples of asymmetrical federalism, where sub-national
units enjoy a level of autonomy, privilege, or power that other sub-national units
within the same state do not necessarily share, also can be found. These examples
share the recognition of the power of jurisdiction as an economic resource.
INTRODUCTION
I guess it is referred to as asymmetrical federalism, where you try to evolve a system, where
you give a bit more power to Quebec to satisfy its needs, but you do not give all those same
powers to the other provinces because then you dilute, in a very significant way, the central
government authority. (Manitoba Legislative Task Force on Canadian Unity, 1997)
BY SANCTIONING the action by a shared government for certain common purposes,
together with the autonomous action by its constituent units for purposes that relate
to maintaining their distinctiveness, federalism is touted often as a formula for sta-
bility in large, sprawling countries with diverse populations and/or ethnic or na-
tional diversity (e.g., Watts, 1999). Asymmetrical federalism goes further, since
this permits one or more of the constituent units (such as states or provinces) within
the federal system to have or exercise more extensive powers than others, relative
to the central government (Stevens, 1977).
Asymmetrical federalism, seen and discussed in Canada, often is proposed as a
device for meeting the specificity and aspirations of the singular province of Que-
bec for control over its cultural and social life without removing it from the Cana-
dian federation, where it coexists with nine largely English-speaking provinces that
have more in common culturally and socially. The Canadian Constitution does not
formally recognize such a system; yet, arrangements over the past several decades
have introduced asymmetrical federalism piecemeal. Quebec today has extensive
authority over immigration, health care, pension plans, and the use of employment
insurance funds for parental leave within its borders, matters that are largely or to-
tally handled by the federal government in/for all the other provinces.
The series of events that took place following Christmas 2004 may have been
felt by some Canadians to be nothing short of extraordinary. They witnessed what
they interpreted as a unique unfolding of asymmetrical federalism for the most
anglophone Canadian province of all: Newfoundland and Labrador (NL).1 A show-
down between the then Prime Minister Paul Martin and NL Premier Danny Wil-
liams signalled a readiness to consider tactics and manoeuvres formerly confined to
Quebec. Moreover, the outcome has shown, on one hand, that exploiting politi-
cal-historical circumstances of the day can be successful in achieving sub-national
goals, with debatable consequences for the Canadian polity. On the other hand, un-
less legalized or somehow codified, the commitment can be rescinded by a new
government in Ottawa.
HIGH DRAMA, ON AND OFF THE FLAG POLE
The fundamental basis for federalism in Canada . . . was and remains the need to reconcile,
balance, and accommodate diversity. (Simeon, 2002)
On Valentine’s Day 2005, Newfoundland and Labrador was guaranteed that it
would keep 100 per cent of its offshore oil and gas revenue, and this without endan-
gering its equalization payments. The event followed in the wake of a walkout by
Premier Williams from negotiations over the distribution of offshore oil and gas
revenue, and a dramatic Christmas and New Year, during which the feisty Premier
ordered the Canadian flag pulled down from all government buildings in the prov-
ince. During those 18 tense days of the Maple Leaf’s sequestration, the province
appeared to be seriously contemplating secession from the Canadian federation
(see Dunn, 2005).
The “flag flap” exposed many sore points in Canadian federal-provincial rela-
tions. Many Canadians were not amused by the grandstanding and much less with
the outcome of the deal: they were quick to decry the agreement as foul and unfair.
Having the cake and eating it too was just not right. In contrast, for Newfound-
landers and Labradoreans, the showdown reignited their sense of pride and dignity
as a people who had a right to effectively manage their offshore resources (and do a
better job with them than the federal government), and cash in on the benefits. For
their Premier, Danny Williams, it meant a strong and welcome surge in popular lo-
cal support. And all were angry and disgusted by Margaret Wente’s newspaper
commentary that viciously downplayed the Newfoundland case with deliberate
condescension and paternalism (Wente, 2005). Premier Williams’s popularity and
his brazen leadership style were significantly boosted, tested, and proofed in this
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showdown and won him a landslide victory in the provincial elections of October
2007.
One could portray the deal as a unique achievement; however, it also is one of
many examples demonstrating an underlying reality in Canadian politics. A large
country with enormous imbalances — in geography, resource wealth, population,
employment opportunities, religious affiliation, and national sentiment — has been
carved into a federal mould to respect this diversity, while maintaining a modicum
of stability and cohesion. For this reason, the “Martin-Williams” showdown of
early 2005 is placed, here, in a wider critical context. First Nations, cities, and uni-
versities in Canada — apart from provinces, territories and municipalities — all are
engaged in decision-making, often within interlocking and overlapping policy re-
gimes. Moreover, all over the world, sub-national, often island, or mainly island,
jurisdictions — like Newfoundland and Labrador — are key actors in this contem-
porary game of intersecting governance, recognizing their jurisdiction as an eco-
nomic resource. They often seek to exploit the economic opportunities offered by
their jurisdictional capacity in such sectors as tourism, financial services, or indus-
trial promotion, while maintaining an umbilical cord to a much larger, and richer,
state and/or regional power, which would (at times begrudgingly) come in to cover
the costs of social services, inject heavy capital investments, or stave off economic
downturns. Their small size, strong political organization, and shrewd “glocal” po-
sitioning typically serve them well; nor is theirs necessarily a “zero-sum game”
(Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1997: 29).
Within a federal political system, some degree of self-rule is granted to
sub-national levels. This allocation of jurisdiction can defuse political conflict by
providing alternative sites of power and patronage. It can help to accommodate
sub-national identities within an overarching identity, such as a country. It can pro-
vide a basis for protecting regional cultures and languages. It can give political
weight to a community that otherwise would not enjoy it (Ghai, 2002: 44-5). The
stuff of federal politics is largely framed by carefully worded constitutions that de-
clare what powers are held by whom, but then federalism is consumed by negotia-
tions between the national core and the sub-national periphery as to how to interpret
the fine print—and how to balance, usurp, or renege on the rest.
With multiple peripheries negotiating with the centre, however, as is the case
in Canada, one would assume that the logical route to take is that of equal treatment.
Whether one is dealing with fiscal transfers, executive powers, tax measures, citi-
zenship rights, or level of public services, arguably, the safest and fairest approach
is an even and impartial division. But how can one treat Prince Edward Island
equally to Ontario? How can one treat a province like a territory? How can one rec-
oncile the unique demands of the nation Québécois, and those of various Aborigi-
nal peoples, for more self-governance and/or resource control?
For the sake of the maintenance of the central Canadian state (how else to ef-
fectively protect against the strident unilateralism of the US?), it appears that any
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idiosyncratic powers exercised by the provinces, Quebec, and First Nations must
be curtailed. Otherwise, in order to assuage demands for sub-national and provin-
cial autonomy, the federal cast that holds the country together would be danger-
ously weakened. The situation has the hallmarks of a Catch-22. Yet, only by
forgoing the basic principle of equal treatment can the Canadian polity accommo-
date different forms of partnership simultaneously. An “imperial temptation”
(Laforest, 1998) by the central government; a priority for advancing, country-wide,
basic human rights and freedoms (as during the Trudeau era); and the myth of a
uni-national Canada (Kymlicka, 1998)—such and similar initiatives may have sty-
mied this centripetal development. The situation now appears to have changed, and
continues to unfold following the election of a Conservative minority government
in 2006 and again in 2008. Opportunities for a resort to de facto, asymmetric feder-
alism in policy-making continue to present themselves in the guise of pragmatic
provincial governments willing to risk “cutting their own deals” with Ottawa, fiscal
flexibility, and a need to expand into north-south relations that reflect commercial
transactions (RSC, 2005). Meanwhile, Quebec — now recognized by Parliament as
“a nation within a united Canada” (Thompson, 2006) — has been granted formal
representative rights in UNESCO, an international organization: this is a measure of
diplomacy and international relations typically reserved, even in federal countries,
to the central government (PMO, 2006; Gwyn, 2005).
Canadians may be angry, worried, and confused; one doubts whether there are
(as yet) any clear ideas of what is being spawned in the medium to long term. The
extent to which asymmetry is politically acceptable and legally and administra-
tively legitimate is also driven by political values; and yet no broad consensus on
such values appears to exist in Canada (RSC, 2007). Moreover, the Martin-Williams
deal and a similar one brokered at the same time with Nova Scotia were not reached
as part of a broader national program, their ad hoc nature smacks of political oppor-
tunism, and a new federal government in Ottawa since 2006 appears inclined to re-
open “the deal.” In any case, the outcome may hold new challenges for devolution
and innovative governance, both in/by provinces (Alberta?), as well as in/by small
and remote rural regions.
THE CASE FOR DIFFERENCE
To some extent, the provinces expected to be and have been treated differently all
along. Asymmetry has been the name of the game with respect to a raft of “jurisdic-
tional powers and duties, the shape of central institutions, or the application of na-
tional laws or programs” (Milne, 2005). Specific provinces (mainly, but not only,
Quebec) have secured, or have been given, specific arrangements — whether en-
shrined (1) in the 1867 Canadian Constitution — as in the case of denominational
education, the qualification of judges and language (for Quebec), as well as the un-
equal representation of the provinces in the Senate; (2) in provincial Acts of Union,
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as in the commitment to a steamship and telegraph service to PEI, and the withhold-
ing of provincial control over natural resources in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba until 1930; (3) via asymmetry by design, as in regional development
(ACOA only for Atlantic Canada), as well as in foreign policy (New Brunswick and
Quebec represented in La Francophonie); and finally (4) in de facto program imple-
mentation, as in immigration, child care, tax collection, student loan plans, health
care, and many other policies pursued by the province of Quebec (for review, see
Milne, 2005; Hogg, 1977). Yet, de facto provisions, not codified in the Constitution
or legislation, can be rescinded: it had been the practice to appoint at least one min-
ister from PEI in each federal cabinet; this is no longer so under the first (2006-8)
Harper government.2
A second motivating force towards arrangements of asymmetrical autonomy
relates to the defence of minority rights and the promotion of minority identity.
This has found its most obvious expression in Canada with regard to the rights of in-
digenous peoples. Land rights, revenue-sharing arrangements from land-based re-
sources, and other forms of autonomy for Aboriginal peoples have been negotiated
in recent years, others are in the offing, and others still are being contested. Indige-
nous governance practices, including the resort to consensus, non-party politics,
communal decision-making, and a totally different relationship with air, sea, and
land, are instructive procedures. The world’s largest political unit with a largely in-
digenous population is the territory of Nunavut, carved out of the North in 1999.
Around 85 per cent of its population of some 30,000 are Inuit (Légaré, 2002).
In a third arena of asymmetry, note the particular struggles of the short-lived
Martin Liberal minority government to secure its own political survival and even-
tual re-election on a stronger footing, hanging on by the smallest of margins in a
budget confidence vote, while sitting on the largest continuous series of budget sur-
pluses in Canadian history, and with “peak oil” heralding deep federal pockets for
years to come. This fortuitous (and as we now know, transient) combination of cir-
cumstances created an unparalleled historic opportunity for provinces to demand
their share of the additional national wealth, each in ways that satisfy particular in-
terests, with no attempt at interprovincial harmonization, and with a strong likeli-
hood that each would actually get most of what each would have asked for — if only
they acted fast enough. Newfoundland and Labrador’s Atlantic Accord of February
2005 is one such result. Nova Scotia secured its own, similar deal concurrently. On-
tario was pledged a refund of $5.75 billion over 5 years in May 2005. PEI and New
Brunswick sought to follow suit with their own $100 million deals (Thibodeau,
2005), but these deals were not secured prior to the demise of the Martin govern-
ment in January 2006.
A fourth, and more compelling, move that does not respond to the constitution-
ally established centres of executive power is the major interest of recent years in
cities as new jurisdictions. We have at hand an “urban asymmetry,” one that creates
cleavages through the historical fabric of the Canadian federation. This term means
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that the federal government has actively flirted with pursuing direct relationships
with the larger urban centres and agglomerations of the country, and also with other
players, such as universities (for example, the Canada Research Chairs program;
see www.chairs.gc.ca) and special-purpose bodies, and that this drive is premised
on two key rationales.
The first basis for this new relationship is needs. Canada, the world’s second
largest country by land area, is possibly the world’s most urbanized state. While the
population density averaged out over the whole country was a meagre 3.3 persons
per km2 in census year 2001, 79.4 per cent of its population lived in communities of
more than 1,000 persons and with a population density of more than 400 persons
per km2 at the same time (Beckstead and Brown, 2005). A further 19.4 per cent
lived within commuting distance of an urban area with a population of at least
10,000 residents: the so-called urban shadow (Polèse and Shearmur, 2002). More-
over, the pattern is set to continue: 74 per cent of the country’s recent immigrants —
which number around 250,000 annually and now represent the major form of popu-
lation increase nationwide — settle in Toronto (46 per cent), Vancouver (15 per
cent), or Montreal (13 per cent) (The Guardian, 2003).
The second rationale is economic potential. The transformation of the world
into a series of “prosperous city regions” (Ohmae, 2000: 33), with the remainder
doomed to poverty and political marginality, is gripping policy-makers. Cities are
deemed the only viable route to economic prosperity. They are the dynamic export
and innovation platforms of the new knowledge economy. They may be hitherto
lacking constitutional status, but only they have the critical mass of people, educa-
tional institutions, markets, talent, and finance to undertake research, compete, and
create value. “As go our GCRs” [global city regions], argues Tom Courchene, “so
goes Canada” (Courchene, 2005: 31; Dunn, 2004).
Cities had successfully convinced the Martin Liberal government that they
cannot simply remain creatures of provinces: they can and will manage their affairs
better and more economically if they are recognized as legitimate actors in the con-
stellation of federal governance and are legitimate recipients of direct federal fund-
ing, bypassing the provinces (e.g., Plunkett, 2004). Theirs is a strong case for
implementing subsidiarity. While provincial concerns persevere in support of rural
settlements and their challenges of employment, service provision, and population
growth, many federal pundits have been extolling the virtues of urbanization. They
are advising that, unless cities are granted more fiscal autonomy and stability, the
basis of Canada’s prosperity (read “urban” prosperity) will be eroded (e.g., Slack
and Bird, 2007).
A case in point is that made by Globe and Mail columnist John Ibbitson, who
observed that wages and salaries are highest in large cities and lowest in remote ru-
ral regions. So, for example, per capita annual employment income in St. John’s in
census year 2001 was $14,303, while in remote rural regions of Newfoundland and
Labrador it was $5,490: just 38 per cent of the urban rate, the highest urban-rural
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differential in the country. Ibbitson deduces that Canada’s poorest provinces,
which include all four Atlantic ones, are poor because they are the ones without
large cities. Therefore, he argues, the best way to increase average incomes is sim-
ply to concentrate populations in large metropolitan areas (Ibbitson, 2005). The
truth is more complex than that; however, this wry commentary faithfully reflects
the ethic of federal involvement, which is today distinctly more economic than so-
cial, its strategy intent on picking winners, not shoring up losers.
And so, Canadians are now witnessing “a new inter-governmental relations
nested in an increasingly complex set of sub-provincial [and ultra-provincial] part-
nerships” (Dunn, 2004: 42). First Nations, cities, universities — apart from prov-
inces, territories, and municipalities — are engaged in decision-making, often
within interlocking and overlapping policy regimes. Asymmetrical federalism is
even more de rigueur, even if its introduction is piecemeal, and driven by pragmatic
considerations. This is a very different climate from what obtained nationally
nearly 30 years ago, when the Charter of Rights and Freedoms proclaimed a lan-
guage of common and equal rights in the Constitution Act, 1982. Any resort to idio-
syncratic “sub-national autonomy” would then have largely been looked upon as
“anomalous, annoying or even amusing exceptions” to the sovereignty rule
(Stevens, 1977: 178): incentives for spiralling devolution, fuelling secession and
catalyzing an eventual implosion of the state.
SUB-NATIONAL ISLAND JURISDICTIONS
Not so today. And, to add grist to the mill, there are various successful examples of
asymmetrical federalism around the world, where sub-national units enjoy some
level of autonomy as well as privileges or powers that other sub-national units
within the same state do not necessarily share. The very large majority of these
units are islands, on islands, or mainly islands.3 Newfoundland and Labrador is but
one example. There are over 100 such permanently populated island territories,
which can be referred to as sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs) (Baldacchino,
2006c; Baldacchino and Stuart, 2008). They can be found all over the world, in dif-
ferent sizes, with different populations. They range from Taiwan (21.5 million) and
Puerto Rico (3.6 million) to Pitcairn (just 47 inhabitants). (See the Appendix to this
chapter.) Possibly the best known SNIJ, since 1997, is the “special administrative re-
gion” of Hong Kong.
These island units, in spite of their obvious diversity and geographical spread,
are largely characterized by one or more various “special” endowments: (1) they
are non-sovereign states with strong levels of internal autonomy, de jure [at law], de
facto [in practice], or both; (2) they are sub-national, meaning that they continue to
be associated with a, usually very much larger, sovereign state; in some cases, this
would be their former colonial master; (3) they are sub-national, meaning that they
have a distinct society and culture, and are often recognized as constituent “na-
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tions” within the larger state; (4) they are islands, physically cut off from mainlands
and often geographically remote from their metropolitan powers, and therefore,
they present pragmatic cases for administrative autonomy; (5) the bulk of their citi-
zenry supports local politicians who are neither integrationist nor sovereignist, but
who delicately exploit “the best of all possible worlds” (Everard and Holt, 2004:
188), using their jurisdiction as a key economic and political resource; and (6) they
either escape regulation or customize it to suit their interests — or else have it thus
crafted so as to suit the interests of the metropole — whether it is tax policy, lan-
guage policy, citizenship rights, or transportation costs.
Even in the age of globalization, comparative research shows that small can
still be beautiful and affluent. The island citizens of Aruba, Bermuda, French Poly-
nesia, and Iceland have been counted among the world’s top 10 richest peoples in
2003 (The Economist, 2003: 33). Moreover, on average, the citizens of non-sover-
eign island territories tend to be even richer per capita than sovereign ones
(Bertram, 2004; Poirine, 1998), and to enjoy steady, net immigration, even though
they tend to be relatively resource-poor (McElroy and Sanborn, 2004).
These observations suggest that, today, a relatively small autonomous territory
is not well advised to seek sovereign status but to craft an ever-increasing autonomy
within asymmetrical federalism. Evidence of this change of tack is the total absence
of newly independent, fully sovereign small states on the world stage since Brunei
in 1984 — with the single exception of East Timor in 2002.4 Referenda in various
islands — Bermuda, the Dutch Antilles, Mayotte, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands
— have all rejected independence by huge margins. The desire for independence is
more likely to be triggered from a sense of frustration over restricted powers within
the federalist arrangement (Thorndike, 1989).
More research needs to be undertaken among this interesting collection of ju-
risdictions. The complex political and economic dynamics of “sub-nationalism”
make increasing sense in a world where levels of governance are expanding both
above (supranational) and below (municipal) the level of the sovereign state
(Baldacchino, 2004a). A quick scan of the manner in which some of these SNIJs de-
ploy their jurisdictional powers is instructive; not just to other islands, but also to
other regions that could turn geographical remoteness and separation into an ad-
vantage to leverage special status and discretionary powers.
The relevance of “island studies” to non-geographical islands is a pertinent one
to discuss here. After all, literal islands — pieces of land surrounded by water — are
only one sort of insular situation in the physical world. A lake is presumably as
much an island to the fish and amphibians that may inhabit it; and a clump of trees in
a city park as much an island to its birds and squirrels. Our obsession with one type
of island may stem from a jaundiced, continental understanding of the sea as the ul-
timate barrier. But a watery expanse may prove easier to cross than a desert, a
swamp, a mountain range, a huge plain, or a forest (Baldacchino, 2004b). A remote
settlement, or a refugee camp, may thus effectively be even more isolated and insu-
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lar than an island. And the impact of bridges on islands connected to mainlands may
be comparable to the impact of land or air transportation infrastructure and services
on a remote rural community (Baldacchino, 2006a).
RELATING TO GOVERNANCE TOOLS
How do these diverse, physically remote, often peripheralized autonomies navigate
and negotiate the fuzzy ground between sovereignty and dependency? A number of
policy issues emerge as particularly salient in the development strategies of most
sub-national island jurisdictions: these areas of political economy are most likely to
fall within the realm of self-rule. They are looked on by many sub-national island
authorities and spokespersons as areas of competence they would most prefer to
have under local control; and no wonder, since they could be critical ingredients in
shaping economic prosperity (e.g., Milne, 2000).
Managing Rural-Urban Interaction
In recognition of the increasing, strategic shuttling and flow of individuals to and
from cores and peripheries over time, an a priori acceptance of a “zero-sum” brain
drain or brain gain may well need to be replaced by reference to a more “posi-
tive-sum” brain rotation or brain circulation phenomenon (The Economist, 2005:
18; Baldacchino, 2006b). After all, suburban dwellers may live most of their work-
ing days in a larger city; big-city dwellers may spend their summers in remote cot-
tages; and successful dwellers of islands, remote rural regions, and other
peripheries habitually refresh themselves — professionally, materially, and cultur-
ally — in towns, cities, or metropoles. The focus inmigration analysis needs to shift
from place to movement. The periphery as just a finite place where one has roots
must give way to the periphery as a platform for sorties and routes into the wider
world, if it is to survive. Many contemporary knowledge professionals move
around wherever their work may take them (e.g., Ó Riain, 2000), and this pattern of
mobility can be extended to other categories. In other instances, it may not even be
necessary to move physically, since information and communication technologies
can, in some instances, bridge distances effectively. Many so-called “places” are
actually “spaces of flows” — particularly roads, cars, bridges, rail stations, ferries,
ferry terminals, airports, airplanes — significant only as locations that capture peo-
ple in collective motion; they are arteries of movement, and have no sense when
forced into either a rural or urban cast. Thus, with expanding transport infrastruc-
ture, traditional mining towns are giving way to “fly-in/fly-out” communities —
like Voisey’s Bay (Inco, 1997) — where employees spend only one or more weeks
in a camp at the mine, but alternate this with similar periods at home with their fami-
lies.
Transportation is often a triple problem of choice, time, and price for islanders.
Generally speaking, islanders know that transportation options and frequencies de-
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crease and verge towards monopoly provision, while transit times increase and
prices rise with increasing distance from mainland areas and with decreasing size
of a specific island’s population (CPMR, 2002: 25-6). Archipelagic islands com-
pound these issues even further (Bayliss-Smith et al., 1988; Hamilton-Jones,
1992). Difficulties with transportation and access affect a range of issues including:
the viability of a tourism industry, a manufacturing export strategy, absence of
economies of scale, and limitations to emergency off-island health care
(Baldacchino and Milne, 200: 234). The Åland Islands’ development of its own
shipping registry and the safeguarding of duty-free transactions on Åland ships fly-
ing the Åland flag have been crucial to the territory’s economic prosperity
(Lindstrom, 2000: 107-21). The Scottish isles continue to enjoy the monopoly,
state-supported ferry services of Caledonia MacBrayne; the US Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas are exempted
from the protectionist Merchant Marine Act, which elsewhere in the US prevents
foreign-built ships from docking in US ports. Bermuda had threatened independ-
ence in the early 1990s when British Airways considered suspending its scheduled
flights between London Heathrow and Hamilton. Island jurisdictions like Gozo or
Gotland lobby intensely, at both national and European levels, to convince pol-
icy-makers that they deserve subsidized access to regular ferry transportation. The
European Union explicitly recognizes the public service obligations of both air and
sea links to, and between, islands in Europe (CPMR, 2002: 83). Desolate and remote
St. Helena should finally get an international airport by 2010, financed by British
taxpayers (SARTMA, 2005).
Fiscal Management
Various island autonomies enjoy considerable autonomy and responsibility in fis-
cal management. Gotland is the only island region and single commune in Sweden
that manages its own tax revenues. The Cayman Islands and Bermuda have practi-
cally full fiscal independence and do not receive overseas financial assistance from
the UK, which remains mainly responsible on their behalf for defence and interna-
tional relations. Sub-national island jurisdictions often have special, direct rela-
tions with the metropolitan exchequer, and do not have to negotiate fiscal
allocations via multi-tier structures and intermediaries — such as provincial or re-
gional governments. The West Indies Federation broke down in 1962 because the
smaller Caribbean islands did not want to be ruled by Jamaica. In 1979, tiny
Anguilla seceded from the newly independent state of St. Kitts-Nevis, preferring to
remain a colony of Britain. In 2008, the Netherlands Antilles disbanded because the
six Dutch island territories in the Caribbean voted for direct links with Amsterdam.
Gozo has its own territorially responsible minister within the archipelagic state of
Malta.
Many small islands have excelled as offshore finance centres: low tax policies
are perfectly suited to such locations because they are likely to draw in much more
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income by widening the tax base than would be lost from forfeited domestic tax
revenue. Moreover, in sub-national island jurisdictions, their overseeing by larger
states makes them more respectable locations for finance operations (McElroy and
Mahoney, 2000). Successful finance centres in small island economies — like
Labuan, Jersey, Guernsey, and Madeira — however, tend to “crowd out”
pre-existing industries (such as agriculture or small-scale manufacturing), leading
to increases in the price of property and skilled labour (Hampton, 1994).
Devolving Power-Building Capacity
Sub-national islands exploit their typically small size, sense of identity, jurisdic-
tional powers, and sense of difference from their metropolitan power to rally con-
siderable political support. Domestic politics is usually tense and dramatic, many
voter preferences would be known publicly, and voter participation rates are very
high (Hirczy, 1995). Politics is intimate, with both voters and politicians making
sure that they are well known to each other. Personality politics runs high, and dy-
nastic political families are common. Social capital is strong. The media profile of
these islands is not generally high, but they attract considerable international public
sympathy as “underdogs” when struck by an emergency or dramatic event. The
United Kingdom was galvanized into action three times over the last quar-
ter-century because of events impacting its overseas territories, and in a manner to-
tally disproportionate to the number of people involved: the invasion of the
Falklands by Argentina (1982); the eruption of the Soufrière Volcano on
Montserrat (1995); and the child sex abuse scandal on Pitcairn (2004) (Killingray
and Taylor, 2005). The Nicobar and Andaman Islands of India were catapulted into
the international public gaze after the December 2004 tsunami, and were granted
control by New Delhi over the management of financial assistance earmarked for
their rehabilitation (Kelman et al., 2006). Moreover, the skills of local politicians
often are judged on how well they are able to exploit and manoeuvre the island’s
metropolitan links to its net economic advantage (Baldacchino, 2004a). A key po-
litical relationship would be between the elected chief minister and the appointed
governor.
Services and Infrastructure
Service provision and infrastructure maintenance pose particular challenges since
the costs per capita are typically much higher in small territories. Dispersed popula-
tions, often in an archipelagic context, make service provision even more problem-
atic. Economies of scale are often absent; yet health, education, and other social
services, along with the professional staff required to operate them, would be ex-
pected by the locals to be at par with any available on the metropolitan mainland.
Energy production is also more costly, if there is no possibility of tapping into na-
tional grids, which are usually found on mainlands (Stuart, 2006). If the island is
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physically close to the mainland, then such basic services may be made available
off-island and the gap forded by a fixed link and/or efficient air and sea transporta-
tion services. The presence of a significant pool of politically active and articulate
voters usually improves the likelihood that the mainland will respond positively;
this also grants the mainland a valid excuse to practise a form of acceptable “soft
imperialism”: France is one such contemporary example, which ensures, among
other things, that it has the world’s second largest exclusive economic zone (after
the US) (Hintjens and Newitt, 1992).
Natural Resource Management
The management of specific local resources desired by the central state — oil, gas,
mineral deposits, fishing zones, strategic bases, or tourism potential — has been
used to leverage enhanced local policy autonomy. We have mentioned the Atlantic
Accord between Ottawa and St. John’s in this context. North Sea oil and gas have
also led to a renegotiation of the power balance between Faroe Islands and Den-
mark, and between the Shetland Islands and the United Kingdom (Olafsson, 2000;
Blackadder, 1998). Sakhalin Island, with its prized oil resources, has its own gover-
nor, even though it is not a Russian federal district. Still other islands — like Batam
(Indonesia), Jeju (South Korea), Hainan (China), and Kish (Iran) — have benefited
economically by being designated special economic zones (Chongyi and Good-
man, 1997; Royle, 1997; Roston, 2005).
Meanwhile, the contribution of islands to cultural, environmental, and biologi-
cal diversity is proportionately much greater than the size of their territories or pop-
ulations (Young, 1999: 253). This gives them an international standing that could
be used to influence or circumvent domestic politics: a case in point is the
Tasmanian Wilderness, saved from industrial exploitation by its inclusion as a
UNESCO World Heritage Site (Chen and Hay, 2004). Indeed, while islands — ex-
cluding the continents of Antarctica and Australia — occupy just 1.9 per cent of the
Earth’s surface area — 13.1 per cent (106 out of 812) of World Heritage sites are is-
lands or on islands (whc.unesco.org/en/list/). Island World Heritage Sites — like
Rapa Nui, or Galápagos and its national park and marine resources reserve — are
run differently from the mainland provinces of Chile and Ecuador respectively.
External Relations and the Diaspora
Negotiating — between home and away, the edge and the centre, roots and routes
— is the hallmark of island life. A look at entrepreneurship in small islands mani-
fests this vividly. In a study of small, successful, export-oriented manufacturing
firms from five European island regions (Baldacchino and Vella Bonnici, 2005;
Baldacchino, 2005a, 2005b), eight out of 10 showcased firms had entrepreneurs
who either (1) spent long stretches of time living and working away from their is-
land home — in places like London and Stockholm — choosing to return after they
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had amassed the contacts, education, and experience which allowed them a much
better chance of being successful in business; or (2) developed and nurtured inno-
vative business ideas after accumulating skill and contacts working with large,
multinational companies; or (3) got their own local business going after a success-
ful transfer from a dependence on a key international supplier, client, or partner. It
is also not exceptional to find island-based entrepreneurs being lured to the island
from further away, a case of migrating from the core to the periphery (Baldacchino,
1999, 2002; Baldacchino and Fairbairn, 2006).
The ingrained openness of small islands serves to orient their island inhabit-
ants towards the metropole: for inspiration, vacation, shopping, education, em-
ployment, adventure, or just to escape from an excess of familiarity. Small island
history and literature are dominated by the migration theme (King and Connell,
1999). Small island diasporas and “the ties that bind” are strong and vibrant, emo-
tional and nostalgic. Typically, many more islanders live away than remain on their
own island. The exiles — or ex-isles (after Bongie, 1998) — connect with their is-
land home in many ways: receiving news and reading books and magazines from
“home”; sending gifts to family and friends in cash or in kind; visiting as culturally
friendly and long-staying tourists; returning to invest in business, to endow their
university, or to engage in local politics; taking up specialized employment; buying
secondary homes; retiring in style. They constitute a natural consumer market for
distinctive island products overseas.
An engagement with the world is not only assiduously cultivated by island in-
dividuals, however. Although we are talking about sub-national jurisdictions, this
does not prevent them from being active on the diplomatic front on a global or re-
gional scale, circumventing the parent state in the process, and usually much to the
latter’s discomfort. “Para-diplomacy” has involved sub-national governments set-
ting up offices in Brussels or in other countries, within and outside the European
Union (Bartmann, 2006). The ambiguously named, 21-member Overseas Coun-
tries and Territories Association is one such active EU lobby, set up by the Treaty of
Rome in 1957 (europa.eu.int/comm/development/oct/index_en.htm). We have al-
ready mentioned Quebec, an active member of La Francophonie, bypassing Ottawa
to safeguard its interests under NAFTA. De facto island jurisdictions in the interna-
tional system — like the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or the formerly
Tamil-controlled parts of Sri Lanka — press for recognition on the international
stage, seeking to bypass other regimes (Bahcheli et al., 2004). Åland has been a
member of the Nordic Council since 1954. Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands
are associate members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, while
Montserrat is a full member. The Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey have been ac-
tive in signing conventions with other states and international organizations, espe-
cially in the fields of finance, the environment, and trade (OECD, 2004; Gallienne,
2007; Le Rendu, 2004). Quebec’s formal membership in UNESCO may set a Cana-
dian precedent, but not an international one.
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Regional Diversification
Diversification in economic development can be especially tough for small island
jurisdictions. Many tend to be mono-economies, selling one particular export prod-
uct (such as bananas, sugar, copra, fish, or phosphate) or services (like offshore
banking or bunkering of oil, gas, or tradable commodities). Manufacturing is not
naturally competitive in small islands; but some niche export industries — quality
crafts, branded island-specific souvenirs, and non-price-sensitive goods — can be
successfully supported. Many islands are switching to tourism, tapping into short
weekend breaks (if close to a metropolitan market) but possibly doing better when
positioning themselves deliberately as remote, exclusive destinations, attracting
fewer tourists but reaping higher revenue from each.
Nevertheless, just in case the export economy goes into decline, other buffers
are in place. They include: (1) a typically ponderous public sector, responsible for a
third of all jobs or more; (2) a diligent resort to economies of scope, where locals
maintain secondary jobs, grow vegetables, hunt game, fish, chop wood, make and
sell souvenirs, drive taxis, run restaurants, and perform other remunerative activi-
ties that do not always appear on their income tax forms; (3) an open option to emi-
grate to the metropolitan power for jobs and citizenship, should the need arise; and
(4) a strong political lobby with the central government to maintain its responsibili-
ties towards the smaller jurisdiction and stave off any economic catastrophe.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
All these examples have much to tell us about governance in the twenty-first cen-
tury, and they harbour lessons for remote rural settlements as well. Sub-national is-
land jurisdictions strike me as governance entrepreneurs: they manifest creative,
often unique, dynamic expressions of dyadic asymmetry within federal relation-
ships. The economic and political tools they deploy are in part a function of a nego-
tiated outcome of a bilateral relationship with a (usually benign) metropole; a
colonial inheritance; the vibrancy of a local (sub-)national culture; and the ability
of local governments to effectively “rally the troops” and thus represent and ad-
vance local interests.
Some critical ingredients are required to make this phenomenon possible. First
is local political capacity — a legitimate and local power base. Our islands have
elected assemblies that are accountable to their watchful and demanding island vot-
ers. Second, the power base needs to have local economic capacity to act — the
power to collect and spend revenue in accordance with priorities determined in line
with a local strategic vision. In particular, the ability to strive in favour of the “three
Ts”: transportation, tourism, and taxation — corporate or income — is a winning
strategy especially suited to small jurisdictions. A third requirement is a jurisdic-
tion of the right size — there is a fair scatter, but we are referring mainly to polities
that represent 1 per cent or less of the population of the federal ensemble, and
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around 25,000 to 50,000 population. They must not be too small to succumb to pet-
tiness and to a sclerosis arising from insufficient financial or human resources, or to
an excessive dependence on one main employer or investor; but they must not be
too large to alienate voters and fall victim to bureaucrats, technocrats, or interne-
cine partisan rivalry (Richards, 1982). These parameters suggest that, within the
contemporary Canadian context, while the municipality is the obvious reference
point for local governance, the typical municipality (outside metropolitan areas) is
simply too small. A fourth factor is the ability not to allow partisan political cleav-
ages to dissuade the locals from putting up a strong united front against the
metropole. (Remember that the metropole will have every political incentive — in
the raw meaning of the term — to “divide and rule” by fragmenting an island iden-
tity.) Fifth, and following from the above, is the ability to sustain a powerful lobby
directly on the central government for capital investment, especially in transporta-
tion, social services, public-sector jobs, and communications infrastructure. Such
representations should be direct and not via political brokers, and they tend to be
more effective when the locals are represented on federal legislative structures.
Public relations and public opinion can be mobilized to good effect here. Sixth is
the need to maintain an active interest and direct presence in regional and interna-
tional developments, again bypassing intermediate levels of governance, and doing
so mainly with jurisdictions that can be lucrative trade partners, tourist-senders, or
locations of diasporas.
CONCLUSION
When the US Central Intelligence Agency was updating its authoritative World
Factbook for 2005, it explained why it was adding two new “jurisdictions” to its
coverage, as well as why it wasn’t adding a third. These three sort-of “countries”
are, each in its own way, examples of creative governance: the UK sovereign mili-
tary bases of Akrotiri and Dhekelia on Cyprus; the European Union; and the US
base at Guantànamo Bay (the latter was not added as a new jurisdiction).
Key players in (usually large) federal states debate nervously why and to what
extent obvious differences (or asymmetry) in the size, geography, economic
wealth, cultural fabric, or population of their constituent units (regions, states,
provinces) should be translated into asymmetric power, in practice or at law. Mean-
while, sub-national, often small, island jurisdictions have generally prospered from
inventive, asymmetrical federalism. The legislators of various of these sub-units
have deployed their jurisdictional powers to determine their own destiny in most
policy fields, clinching special deals from the centre, jealously guarding their au-
tonomy, while stubbornly refusing sovereignty. They maintain an umbilical cord to
a much larger, richer, and benevolent state and/or regional power. They recognize
jurisdiction as an economic resource. They are aware that the exceptional downing
of a national flag may be an expedient and effective political ploy. Their small size,
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strong political interest, and shrewd “glocal” positioning within the architecture of
multi-level governance have served them well. They demonstrate how “[s]over-
eignty rules can be violated in inventive ways” (Krasner, 2001).
Big lessons, one hopes, from and for the world’s small places.
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APPENDIX: POPULATED SUB-NATIONAL ISLAND, OR MAINLY ISLAND, JURISDICTIONS
AROUND THE WORLD
(Inclusion in this non-exhaustive and dynamic list is not to be construed as an act of acknowl-
edging the legitimacy or otherwise of any jurisdictional powers, de jure or de facto.)
1. West Atlantic/Caribbean: (Anguilla, Aruba, Barbuda, Bermuda, Bonaire,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Curaçao, Guadeloupe, Martinique,
Montserrat, Nevis, Puerto Rico, Saba, San Andrés y Providencia, St. Eustatius,
St. Martin, Sint Maarten, Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, US Virgin Is-
lands). (21)
2. South, Central, and Northeast Atlantic, all related to Britain: (Alderney, As-
cension, Falklands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Northern Ireland, Orkneys,
Sark, Scotland, Shetland Islands, St. Helena, Tristan da Cunha, Wales). (14)
3. Scandinavia: (Åland, Bornholm, Faeroes, Gotland, Greenland, Hiiumaa,
Lofoten, Saaremaa, Svalbard). (9)
4. South Pacific: (Admiralty Islands/Manus, American Samoa, Banaba,
Bougainville, Chatham Island, Cocos [Keeling] Islands, Cook Islands, Easter
Island/Rapa Nui, French Polynesia, Galápagos, Kosrae, Macquarie Island,
New Caledonia, Niue, Norfolk Island, Pitcairn, Pohnpei, Rotuma, Tasmania,
Tokelau, Torres Strait Islands, Truk, Wallis and Futuna, Yap). (24)
5. Northwest Atlantic: (Baffin Island/Nunavut, Cape Breton Island, Newfound-
land and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, St. Pierre et Miquelon). (5)
6. Mediterranean and East Atlantic: Territories associated with European Union
member/applicant countries: (Azores, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Balearics,
Bioko, Canaries, Corsica, Gozo, Madeira, North Cyprus, Príncipe, Sardinia,
Sicily). (12)
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7. Indian Ocean/ East Africa: (Andaman and Nicobar, British Indian Ocean Ter-
ritory, Kish, Lakshadweep, Mayotte, Njazidja, Mwali, Ndzwani, Pemba, Re-
union, Rodrigues, Socotra, Zanzibar). (13)
8. South Asia, East Asia, and North Pacific: (Aceh, Aleutians, Guam, Hainan,
Hawai’i, Hong Kong, Jeju, Kurile Islands, Labuan, Macao, Mindanao, North-
ern Marianas, Okinawa, Queen Charlotte Islands/Haida Gwaii, Sabah,
Sarawak, Sakhalin, South Moluccas, Taiwan). (19)
NOTES
1. The 2006 census reports NL as the province with the largest proportion of residents who
claim the English language as their mother tongue: 98 per cent (Statistics Canada, 2006:
slide 17).
2. Leading to the question: Is the island province being penalized for being the only one not
to send any Conservative MPs to Ottawa in the 2006 federal election?
3. As Chris Dunn has said (personal correspondence, June 2006): “What else would one
expect with regard to islands, but geography-specific accommodations?”
4. The Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia gained “independ-
ence” in the 1990s, but only after approving and signing a Compact of Free Association
with the United States, which effectively robs them of an independent foreign and secu-
rity policy.
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